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i. introduction
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine, named after two Supreme Court cases 
from 1923 and 1983,1 posits that the Supreme Court is the only federal 
court that can exercise appellate review of state-court decisions. Federal 
district courts and courts of appeals are not to do what amounts to 
reviewing state courts’ judgments.2 In 2005, the Supreme Court in Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.3 articulated a set of stringent 
criteria for federal courts to follow in deciding whether a case encounters 
a Rooker–Feldman bar. But since the Court’s decision a year later in 
Lance v. Dennis,4 a significant minority of district courts have taken 
lower-court language quoted but disapproved in Lance as the starting 
point for Rooker–Feldman analysis. We have found eighteen decisions in 
nine districts from 2006 through mid-2020 that take this demonstrably 
misgrounded approach.
This essay examines the Supreme Court’s recent precedents estab-
lishing the contours of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, including the 
* Thomas D. Rowe Jr. is Elvin R. Latty Professor Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. Edward L. Baskauskas is a former 
adjunct professor of law at Golden Gate University School of Law. They serve, respectively, as reviser and drafter for Chapter 
133 of MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which includes coverage of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The views expressed 
here are their own. Thanks for comments on an earlier draft to Professor Rowe’s wife, Professor Emerita Susan French.
1 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
2 Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is a statutorily authorized exception. See 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 133.33[1][d], at 133-60.6 (3d ed. 2020).
3 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
4 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
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Lance decision,5 and the scope and possible effects of the lower courts’ 
misreading of Lance.6 The essay then explores what can be no less 
important for practicing lawyers, judges, and law clerks than the juris-
prudence—possible deficiencies in research methods and in the drafting 
of the per curiam Lance opinion that might have contributed to the 
recurring error.7
ii. background: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 
Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis
After disparate and sometimes expansive lower-court treatments 
of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court’s unanimous 2005 
decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. articulated 
a narrow set of conditions in which the doctrine bars lower-court subject-
matter jurisdiction. The doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by 
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting 
district court review and rejection of those judgments.”8 
The following year in Lance, the Court summarily vacated a three-
judge district-court decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado that had found a Rooker–Feldman bar based on its view that 
the doctrine applied when applicable preclusion law could bind prior 
nonparties, regarded as being in privity, to an adverse prior state-court 
decision. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court had “erroneously 
conflated preclusion law with Rooker-Feldman . . . [,] [which] is not simply 
preclusion by another name.”9
5 See infra part II.
6 See infra parts III, IV.
7 See infra part V.
8 544 U.S. at 284. Some lower courts have distilled from Exxon Mobil’s formulation a list of four requirements for the appli-
cation of Rooker–Feldman. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Breaking down the holding of Exxon Mobil, we conclude that there are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the 
state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting 
the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Hoblock 
v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (“From [Exxon Mobil’s] holding, we can see that there are 
four requirements for the application of Rooker–Feldman. First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court. 
Second, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment. Third, the plaintiff must invite district court 
review and rejection of that judgment. Fourth, the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced—i.e., Rooker–Feldman has no application to federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing 
state-court litigation. The first and fourth of these requirements may be loosely termed procedural; the second and third may 
be termed substantive.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and footnote omitted)).
9 546 U.S. at 466.
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Before repeating its approach from Exxon Mobil, quoted above, the 
Lance Court had described the proceedings below, including quotations 
of the district court’s statement of requirements for Rooker–Feldman to 
apply. This was the passage that, though simply part of the Lance Court’s 
procedural history, several lower courts have taken as the Court’s authori-
tative statement of the criteria for applying the doctrine:
(1) “[T]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually 
been a party to the prior state-court judgment or have been in privity 
with such a party”; (2) “the claim raised in the federal suit must have 
been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court 
judgment”; and (3) “the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-
court claim.”10
There is much overlap between the Lance district court’s formulation 
and the Supreme Court’s in Exxon Mobil, but also notable differences. 
Most prominently, the court below in Lance included, and acted in 
reliance on, the privity language in its first criterion, which is missing from 
the Exxon Mobil articulation and is the point on which the Lance Court 
vacated the lower court’s decision. The “actually . . . a party” phrasing in 
Lance partly coincides with the Supreme Court’s narrower “state-court 
losers” terminology. Exxon Mobil’s limiting factor about “complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments” is absent from the Lance criteria 
as stated by the district court but is perhaps implicit in “the claim raised 
in the federal suit must have been actually raised” in the state-court liti-
gation. The “inextricably intertwined” alternative in the Lance district 
court’s second criterion is absent from the Exxon Mobil Court’s statement. 
The Exxon Mobil Court’s “inviting district court review and rejection” 
language is missing from the Lance district court’s formulation—although 
that factor may be implicit in the district court’s understanding. Finally, 
“must not be parallel” is just an alternative way of referring to “state-court 
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”
iii. erroneous district-court reliance on the 
requirements from the Vacated lower-court opinion
We have found ninetine district-court decisions that quote, in whole 
or in large part, or paraphrase the recount of the Colorado district court’s 
statement of Rooker –Feldman analysis from the Supreme Court’s Lance 
opinion. Remarkably, all but one of the nineteen quote or paraphrase the 
10 Id. at 462 (quoting Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1124 (D. Colo. 2005)). 
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Court’s description accurately but fail to note that this is not what the 
Supreme Court is saying to do.11 
Fortunately, the great majority of lower federal courts do not fall into 
the error of following the Colorado district court’s statement of Rooker–
Feldman analysis that got its decision vacated.12 Still, it is surprising how 
many have done so. Also, except in one instance,13 the slip-up does not 
appear to have led to erroneous applications of the doctrine, at least 
not yet. Four D.C. District decisions, for example—Bradley v. DeWine,14 
Terry v. First Merit National Bank,15 Terry v. DeWine,16 and Jung v. Bank 
of America, N.A.17—involved a situation common in Rooker–Feldman 
litigation: a mortgagor who lost in state-court foreclosure proceedings, 
seeking to have a federal court undo the foreclosure by making claims of 
federal-law violations in connection with the state-court adjudications. 
Federal courts regularly and properly shoo away such state-court losers, 
as did the D.C. District judges in these decisions. Such cases fit the Exxon 
Mobil criteria to a T.
The error of following the Lance recitation of the lower court’s 
analysis is widespread. In addition to the four cases described above, 
we have found it in a fifth case from the D.C. District,18 we have found 
11 The exception is Commodities Export Co. v. City of Detroit, No. 09-CV-11060-DT, 2010 WL 2633042, at *10–11 (E.D. 
Mich. June 29, 2010) (rejecting as frivolous an argument based on quoted language from Lance, pointing out that the party 
making that argument “accurately quotes those certain words from the Court’s opinion in Lance, but the cited material 
comes from the Court’s recitation of the district court opinion which the Court then proceeded to vacate”), aff ’d on other 
grounds sub nom., Commodities Export Co. v. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 695 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2012).
12 In a recent six-month period, for example, thirty-one decisions from twenty district courts recited and applied the 
Exxon Mobil criteria while citing Lance as additional authority for those criteria or related points. During that same period, 
no decisions made the error of using the Lance district court’s criteria. Search performed Apr. 8, 2020, of Westlaw Edge 
database of U.S. District Court decisions that cited both Lance and Exxon Mobil during the preceding six months.
13 See Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 19-1456 PSG, 2019 WL 6448944, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019), 
discussed infra at notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
14 55 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2014) (Bates, J.).
15 75 F. Supp. 3d 499, 508–09 (D.D.C. 2014) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
16 75 F. Supp. 3d 512, 523–24 (D.D.C. 2014) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Professor Rowe has sent letters to all three of the D.C. 
District judges who decided these four cases from that court, pointing out the error of relying on the district court’s language 
quoted in the Supreme Court’s Lance opinion (assuring them that their results were almost certainly correct!). He has 
received no replies. However, in a later case involving Rooker–Feldman and citing Judge Bates’s Bradley decision, supra note 
14, and her own ruling in Terry v. DeWine, Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not cite or quote Lance. See Laverpool v. Taylor Bean & 
Whitaker REO LLC, 229 F. Supp. 3d 5, 15–21 (D.D.C. 2017).
17 No. 18-962, 2018 WL 6680579, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018) (Contreras, J.), aff’d per curiam, No. 19-7049, 2020 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 1426 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2020). The authors sought leave to file a brief as amici curiae urging the D.C. Circuit to issue 
a published opinion correcting the district court’s error of relying on the district court’s language quoted in the Supreme 
Court’s Lance opinion, but the court of appeals dismissed as moot the motion for leave and summarily affirmed the district 
court’s judgment. Quoting Exxon Mobil’s formulation but making no mention of Lance or the Lance district court’s formu-
lation, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court had properly determined that Rooker –Feldman barred the plaintiff ’s 
claims. See Order at 1–2, Jung v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. 19-7049, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1426, at *3–4 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2020) 
(per curiam). 
18 McGary v. Deo Ravindra, No. 19-3249, 2020 WL 4335613, at *3–4 (D.D.C. July 28, 2020).
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it in cases from the Southern District of Alabama;19 the Northern,20 
Central,21 and Southern22 Districts of California; the Southern District 
of Mississippi;23 the District of New Mexico;24 and the District of Puerto 
Rico.25 Even the District of Colorado, whose decision was vacated in 
Lance, has on two occasions restated and applied the same criteria (but 
minus the privity language specifically disapproved in Lance) directly 
after quoting the Exxon Mobil formulation. 26 The details of the decisions 
relying on the Lance recitation of the Colorado district court’s criteria 
are irrelevant for present purposes. As we read the cases, the several 
district courts quite likely reached the correct Rooker–Feldman result in 
all instances but one (and in that instance the correct Rooker–Feldman 
result probably would not have changed the ultimate outcome27). Most 
found a Rooker–Feldman bar; four did not. What is important is the error 
in taking, as what the Supreme Court is prescribing, a set of criteria that 
the Court has supplanted.
iV. Possible effects of the error
If the courts relying on the Lance criteria are reaching mostly correct 
results or outcomes anyway, is there ground for concern about the prolif-
19 Williams v. Patterson, No. 12-592-WS-M, 2013 WL 4827932, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2013); Mitchell v. Bentley, 
11-00687-KD-M, 2012 WL 2862265, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2862147 
(S.D. Ala. July 11, 2012), aff ’d sub nom. Mitchell v. Governor of Ala., 500 F. App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 569 U.S. 973 (2013).
20 Roe v. Cal. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 16-cv-03745-WHO, 2017 WL 2311303, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017).
21 Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 19-1456 PSG, 2019 WL 6448944, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019); Robinson 
v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., CV 19-2185 PSG, 2019 WL 2491550, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2019); Richards v. County 
of Los Angeles, No. CV 17-0400 PSG, 2017 WL 7410985, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2017), aff ’d, 723 F. App’x 556 (9th Cir.) 
(mem.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 419 (2018).
22 Coulter v. Murrell, No. 10-CV-102-IEG, 2010 WL 2985165, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2010); Yeager v. City of San Diego, No. 
05CV2089-BEN, 2007 WL 7032933, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2007), aff’d, 310 F. App’x 133 (9th Cir. 2009) (mem.), cert. denied, 
558 U.S. 1013 (2009). The chambers of the two different judges deciding these cases in the same district may have made the 
same mistake independently; in any event, the later decision does not cite the earlier one.
23 Rustin v. Rustin (In re Rustin), No. 04-50890-NPO, 2011 WL 5443067, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2011).
24 Hawks v. Mattox, No. CIV 09-0436, 2009 WL 10681595, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 22, 2009).
25 Nuñez-Nuñez v. Sanchez-Ramos, 419 F. Supp. 2d 101, 115 n.8 (D.P.R. 2006).
26 Avery v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 17-cv-01016-WJM-KMT, 2017 WL 9615892, at *4–5 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2017), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1466241 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2018); Turf Master Indus. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 
09-cv-00890-MEH-MJW, 2009 WL 2982846, at *5–8 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2009). But cf. Martinez v. Ritter, No. 09-cv-02699-
CMA-MEH, 2010 WL 2649951, at *2–3 (D. Colo. June 9, 2010) (restating Lance district court’s three criteria, without privity 
language, but then applying Exxon Mobil formulation), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 2649985 (D. Colo. 
June 30, 2010).
27 See Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 19-1456 PSG, 2019 WL 6448944, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019) 
(applying the Lance district court’s formulation to conclude that Rooker–Feldman barred claims for relief that had been 
denied by the state court, when proper analysis under Exxon Mobil would have required application of claim preclusion to 
dismiss those claims); see also infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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eration of a formulation that does not match what the Supreme Court has 
prescribed? 
The overlaps of the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil formulation 
with that of the Lance district court outnumber the differences, which 
are mostly unimportant.28 But the inclusion of the “inextricably inter-
twined” concept in the Lance district court’s second requirement is both 
significant and potentially troublesome. The phrase was much used in 
Rooker–Feldman litigation in lower federal courts before Exxon Mobil and 
had a foundation in Feldman itself,29 but it played no role in the analysis in 
Exxon Mobil. The Court there did use the phrase, but only in describing 
the Feldman opinion and in summarizing the proceedings below. The 
term does no work as the Court analyzes and decides Exxon Mobil.
So the Court has not repudiated the “inextricably intertwined” 
language but has articulated an approach that makes no mention of it, 
and it has not used the term in any of its decisions mentioning Rooker–
Feldman since its description of the lower-court proceedings in Lance. 
While the phrase does keep appearing in some post–Exxon Mobil 
decisions in lower federal courts and in our view may properly play a role 
in limited circumstances,30 some courts of appeals have concluded that it 
“has no independent content and serves only as a label for claims that are 
barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”31
The Tenth Circuit, which encompasses the Lance district court as 
well as the New Mexico district court that has made the Lance error,32 
has dispensed with the “inextricably intertwined” language in its Rooker–
Feldman analysis, doubting that it adds anything useful to the Exxon 
Mobil formulation.33 The D.C. Circuit, where five district-court decisions 
making the Lance error have been rendered, has yet to deal with the role 
28 See supra part III. 
29 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983) (“If the constitutional claims presented to a United 
States District Court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plain-
tiff ’s application for admission to the state bar, then the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state 
court decision.”); id. at 487 (some of the federal plaintiffs’ “allegations are inextricably intertwined with the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny [their] petitions. The District Court, therefore, does 
not have jurisdiction over these elements of [their] complaints.”).
30 See Thomas D. Rowe Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis 
After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 1 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 367, 377–82 (2006).
31 18 Moore’s, supra note 2, § 133.33[2][e][ii], at 133-60.52.
32 See Hawks v. Mattox, No. CIV 09-0436, 2009 WL 10681595, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 22, 2009).
33 See Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1282–83 (10th Cir. 2012) (“What did the words ‘inextricably intertwined’ 
add? . . . It is unclear whether a claim could be inextricably intertwined with a judgment other than by being a challenge to 
the judgment. . . . We think it best to follow the Supreme Court’s lead, using the Exxon Mobil formulation and not trying to 
untangle the meaning of inextricably intertwined. The essential point is that barred claims are those ‘complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments.’ In other words, [for Rooker–Feldman to apply,] an element of the claim must be that the 
state court wrongfully entered its judgment.” (citation omitted)).
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of “inextricably intertwined” in a reported opinion. In two unreported 
decisions, it has used “inextricably intertwined” in the Rooker–Feldman 
context without explicitly addressing the role that the term should play in 
Rooker–Feldman analysis after Exxon Mobil.34
The views of other circuits on “inextricably intertwined,” including 
those in which the other district-court cases making the Lance error 
have been decided, vary and do not warrant further discussion here.35 
District courts need to check circuit precedent since Exxon Mobil and not 
use “inextricably intertwined” just because it had become a widely used 
mantra before that decision—and especially not out of reliance on the 
lower court’s Lance criteria.
A further possibility for mischief, we can hope a remote one, is that 
courts looking to the Supreme Court’s quotation of the Lance district 
court’s formulation and including the privity concept (from the first 
requirement of that formulation) might fall into the same error—fusing 
privity preclusion with Rooker–Feldman—that led the Lance Court to 
vacate the decision below. Someone in privity with a prior state-court 
loser might well, of course, lose in a second proceeding, but on substantive 
preclusion rather than procedural jurisdiction grounds. And the dispo-
sition could differ; some courts say that Rooker–Feldman dismissals are 
neither with nor without prejudice but are purely jurisdictional,36 whereas 
a loss on preclusion grounds would be with prejudice. 
The Lance district court’s formulation lacks the Exxon Mobil Court’s 
reference to state-court losers “complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of 
those judgments” (the second and fourth Exxon Mobil requirements 
listed above).37 In most instances there will be little reason for concern 
that district courts relying on the lower court’s language will be led astray; 
after all, most of the cases that have relied on it seem to us still to have 
gotten their results right. But the Supreme Court’s injury and review-and-
rejection factors help focus inquiries. They can also sort out situations 
involving the likes of injuries suffered from adversaries’ pre-litigation 
conduct and unremedied in state-court litigation, or harms caused by 
34 See Jarvis v. District of Columbia, 561 F. App’x 11, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.) (“Appellant’s claims are ‘so “inextricably 
intertwined” with a state court decision that “the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state court 
decision.”’” (citing and quoting a pre-Exxon Mobil D.C. Circuit decision)); Rodriguez v. Editor in Chief, 285 F. App’x 756, 759 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (certain of the federal plaintiff ’s “claims challenge decisions by the Virginia state bar and the 
Virginia courts or are inextricably intertwined with such decisions. To the extent that those decisions were final at the time 
of the filing of the complaint, the claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).
35 See generally 18 Moore’s, supra note 2, § 133.33[2][e][ii], at 133-60.52 to .52(2).
36 See id. § 133.33[2][f ], at 133-60.52(12).
37 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
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illegal actions in efforts to collect on state-court judgments.38 In such 
cases, Rooker–Feldman does not bar federal jurisdiction over matters 
already litigated in state courts, unless the federal plaintiffs complain 
of injuries caused by the state-court judgments or invite district-court 
review and rejection of those judgments.39
 Because these elements are missing from the Lance district court’s 
formulation, a mechanical application of that formulation can lead to an 
incorrect Rooker–Feldman result in a case in which the plaintiff seeks 
a judgment that would be inconsistent with a state-court judgment but 
does not seek to modify or set aside that judgment.40 (Again, the federal 
plaintiff might lose because of preclusion from the state-court judgment; 
but as the Supreme Court made clear in Lance, that is a separate issue.) 
This is what happened in Lewis v. L.A. Metropolitan Transit Authority.41 
After the state court dismissed the plaintiff ’s claims with prejudice, he 
brought essentially the same claims in a federal suit. The claimed injury 
arose from the defendant’s pre-litigation conduct and not from the state 
court’s judgment, which simply left that conduct unpunished. The district 
court applied the Lance district court’s formulation to conclude that 
Rooker–Feldman barred federal jurisdiction.42 But under Exxon Mobil, 
this was error; the district court should instead have analyzed the plain-
tiff ’s claims under the rubric of claim preclusion.43
The third criterion from the vacated Lance district-court opinion 
quoted in the Supreme Court’s summary vacatur is not problematic. 
The requirement that “the federal claim must not be parallel to the 
state-court claim” tracks Exxon Mobil’s third factor, that the state-court 
38 See generally 18 Moore’s, supra note 2, § 133.33[2][d][ii], at 133-60.28 to .38.
39 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (Rooker–Feldman does not “stop a district court from exercising subject-matter juris-
diction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court. If a federal 
plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case 
to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles 
of preclusion” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis omitted)); see Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 
F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain 
only of a third party’s actions, when the third party’s actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, 
acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.”).
40 See, e.g., Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169, 1173–76 (10th Cir. 2018) (no Rooker–Feldman bar, because 
federal suit sought damages for defendants’ conduct predating state-court orders entered pursuant to state’s nonjudicial-
foreclosure procedure: “Plaintiff is not seeking to set aside either order. Her claims are based on events predating the [state 
nonjudicial-foreclosure] proceedings. She could certainly obtain damages from the defendants without setting aside the 
foreclosure sale. . . . [I]nconsistent judgments are the province of preclusion doctrine . . . .”).
41 No. CV 19-1456 PSG, 2019 WL 6448944 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019).
42 Id. at *4–5.
43 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293; see also Mayotte, 880 F.3d at 1174–75 (“What is prohibited under Rooker-Feldman is a 
federal action that tries to modify or set aside a state-court judgment because the state proceedings should not have led to 
that judgment. Seeking relief that is inconsistent with the state-court judgment is a different matter, which is the province of 
preclusion doctrine.” (citation omitted)).
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judgment must have been “rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced.”44 Fine, and maybe no harm no foul, but there seems little 
point in phrasing the concept differently from what the Supreme Court 
has prescribed. As Professor Rowe used to tell his law students, “If the 
Supreme Court gives you a recipe, cook with it.”
V. why does this keep happening?
a. multiple independent occurrences
The error of following the Lance district court’s formulation appears 
to have arisen independently in each court that has made the error. 
The cases come early and late, with the one from the District of Puerto 
Rico decided in the same year as Lance and the latest one from the D.C. 
District handed down in 2020.45 The courts do not cite a source other than 
Lance itself and various other Rooker–Feldman cases that do not make 
the error; three of the decisions, one of those from the Central District of 
California, the one from the Northern District of California, and the one 
from the District of Puerto Rico, do not even cite the Supreme Court’s 
leading Exxon Mobil opinion, relying solely on its summary follow-on in 
Lance and giving only the criteria from the lower-court decision that the 
Supreme Court vacated.46 We have found no separate common origin for 
the mistake such as a misstatement in a treatise or article.47
The different district courts do not cite each other, although the 
two most recent opinions of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia cite an earlier decision of that court from a different judge.48 
The five decisions in that district are from four different judges; maybe the 
44 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
45 See McGary v. Deo Ravindra, No. 19-3249, 2020 WL 4335613, at *3–4 (D.D.C. July 28, 2020).  
46 See Richards v. Cty. of L.A., No. CV 17-0400 PSG, 2017 WL 7410985, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2017), aff ’d, 723 F. App’x 
556 (9th Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 419 (2018); Roe v. Cal. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 16-cv-03745-WHO, 2017 
WL 2311303, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017); Nuñez-Nuñez, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 115 n.8. Curiously, one opinion from the 
Southern District of Alabama recites and then applies the Lance district court’s formulation point by point, while asserting in 
a footnote that “we will apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as interpreted by Exxon.” See Williams v. Patterson, No. 12-592-
WS-M, 2013 WL 4827932, at *4, n.8 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2013). 
47 The error does crop up in a 2011 article that, because of its timing, could not have been a common origin of the district 
courts’ mistakes (and none of the post-2011 decisions making the error cites the article). See Peter C. Alexander, Bank-
ruptcy, Divorce, and the Rooker–Feldman Doctrine: A Potential Marriage of Convenience, 13 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 81, 99–104, 
n.120 (2011) (using Lance district court’s formulation and wrongly citing that court’s decision as “aff’d on other grounds” by 
Supreme Court). And the misreading of Lance has appeared in one state administrative decision that we have found. See N. 
Cent. Elec. Coop. v. Otter Tail Power Co., Case No. PU-11-701, 2012 WL 3174113 ¶ 21 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 14, 
2012) (discussing precedent effects of related state- and federal-court decisions, but deciding the case on grounds other than 
Rooker–Feldman), aff’d sub nom. N. Cent. Elec. Coop. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 837 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 2013). 
48 See McGary, 2020 WL 4335613, at *3 (Kelly, J.) (citing Bradley v. DeWine, 55 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2014) (Bates, 
J.)); Jung v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 18-962, 2018 WL 6680579, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018) (Contreras, J.) (same), aff ’d, No. 
19-7049 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2020).
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first judge there didn’t notice, with the chambers deciding the later cases 
trusting the soundness of the first decision’s (demonstrably misgrounded) 
approach.49 The same might have happened in the Southern District of 
California, where two decisions were rendered by different judges, and the 
later decision does not cite the earlier one.50 The three decisions in the 
Central District of California are from the same district judge.51 The two 
decisions in the Southern District of Alabama were based on reports and 
recommendations by one magistrate judge.52
If the error occurred just once or twice, one might wonder if law 
clerks got sloppy, or if advocates were careless at best (dishonest at 
worst53) and adversaries asleep at the switch. But the repeated, inde-
pendent occurrences suggest that something more systematic is at work.
b. reading comprehension
Eleven of the eighteen opinions, from seven district courts, repeat 
the requirement of “privity” from the Lance district court’s formulation.54 
But as already noted, the Supreme Court in Lance specifically rejected 
49 See supra notes 14–18. But cf. Eugene Volokh, Academic Legal Writing 101–03 (2d ed. 2005) (“Whenever you 
make a claim about some source, you nearly always must read the original source. Do not rely on an intermediate source—
whether a law review article or a case—that cites the original. . . . Intermediate sources may seem authoritative, but they’re 
often unreliable, whether because of bias or honest mistake. You can’t let their mistakes become your mistakes.”).
50 Coulter v. Murrell, No. 10-CV-102-IEG, 2010 WL 2985165, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (Gonzalez, C.J.); Yeager v. City 
of San Diego, No. 05CV2089-BEN, 2007 WL 7032933, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2007) (Benitez, J.), aff ’d, 310 F. App’x 133 (9th 
Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1013 (2009).
51 See Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 19-1456 PSG, 2019 WL 6448944, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019) 
(Gutierrez, J.); Robinson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., CV 19-2185 PSG, 2019 WL 2491550, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) 
(Gutierrez, J.); Richards, 2017 WL 7410985, at *6 (Gutierrez, J.). 
52 See Williams v. Patterson, No. 12-592-WS-M, 2013 WL 4827932, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2013) (Steele, J., adopting 
report and recommendation of Milling, M.J.); Mitchell v. Bentley, 11-00687-KD-M, 2012 WL 2862265, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 
20, 2012 (Milling, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2862147 (S.D. Ala. July 11, 2012) (DuBose, J.), aff ’d 
sub nom. Mitchell v. Governor of Ala., 500 F. App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 973 (2013).
53 The possibility that counsel were deliberately trying to mislead courts seems slim in most of the cases, because it is 
usually hard to see a possible advantage in getting a court to use the Lance district court’s formulation rather than that of 
the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil. An exception would be if a party were trying to get the court to apply Rooker–Feldman 
to bar jurisdiction over a claim by a federal-court plaintiff in privity with a prior state-court loser, which is exactly what the 
Supreme Court disapproved in Lance. It does appear that a defendant in Commodities Export Co., supra note 11, may have 
unsuccessfully tried such a ploy. See Commodities Export Co. v. City of Detroit, No. 09-CV-11060-DT, 2010 WL 2633042, 
at *10–11 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2010) (rejecting as frivolous argument that Rooker–Feldman should apply on basis of privity, 
pointing out that party making that argument “accurately quotes those certain words from the Court’s opinion in Lance, 
but the cited material comes from the Court’s recitation of the district court opinion which the Court then proceeded to 
vacate.”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Commodities Export Co. v. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 695 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2012). In 
some of the other cases relying on the Lance district court’s language, their quotations omit the language about privity at the 
end of the first requirement. See infra note 54. And whether the opinions include that language or not, privity issues have not 
been present in the Rooker–Feldman analysis in any of the other cases.
54 The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, whose decision was vacated in Lance, omitted privity from the 
formulation in later cases. See Avery v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 17-cv-01016-WJM-KMT, 2017 WL 9615892, at *4 (D. Colo. 
Nov. 20, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1466241 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2018); Turf Master Indus. v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs, No. 09-cv-00890-MEH-MJW, 2009 WL 2982846, at *5–8 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2009). The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia is the only other court whose opinions adopting the Lance district court’s formulation omit privity. 
See McGary v. Deo Ravindra, No. 19-3249, 2020 WL 4335613, at *3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2020); Jung v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 
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privity as a relevant consideration in deciding whether Rooker–Feldman 
applies.55 The issue in Lance was not complex, and the per curiam opinion 
is straightforward.
The conclusion is inescapable and troubling: the authors of these 
district-court opinions did not actually read the Supreme Court’s full 
Lance opinion (or worse, they read but did not comprehend what Lance 
was saying about the lower court’s privity requirement). Even if a district 
judge might unquestioningly adopt the analysis of a previous opinion 
within the district, the initial failure to read or comprehend Lance 
happened at least seven separate times in these district courts.
Most district judges have law clerks or research staff whose job is to 
help guard against such errors. And even if the judge and his or her staff 
are too overburdened to read and comprehend authorities they are relying 
on to craft their analysis, counsel representing a party56 has a strong 
incentive to point out when the district court relies on incorrect law. So in 
each of these cases, the Lance error was likely the product of slack efforts 
by multiple actors.
How can it be that so many judges, lawyers, and research staff feel 
confident quoting and relying on a Supreme Court decision they haven’t 
bothered to read in full? Perhaps modern research techniques played a 
small role.
Technological advances provide ever-more-efficient research tools, 
but in this instance the ease of searching electronic databases of judicial 
opinions might have facilitated the error. We performed a search of 
Westlaw Edge’s database of U.S. Supreme Court cases using the question 
What are the elements of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine (no quotation 
marks or other punctuation). With the results sorted by relevance, the first 
two cases displayed were Exxon Mobil and Lance. And selecting “Most 
detail” brought up the passage in which the Lance Court quoted the lower 
court’s statement of Rooker–Feldman’s “requirements.”57 For a researcher 
18-962, 2018 WL 6680579, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), aff ’d, No. 19-7049 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2020); Terry v. DeWine, 75 F. 
Supp. 3d 512, 523 (D.D.C. 2014); Terry v. First Merit Nat’l Bank, 75 F. Supp. 3d 499, 508 (D.D.C. 2014); Bradley v. DeWine, 55 
F. Supp. 3d 31, 41 (D.D.C. 2014). 
55 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56 Plaintiffs were represented by counsel in only six of the eighteen cases in which the Lance error was made. See Lewis, 
2019 WL 6448944; Robinson, 2019 WL 2491550 ; Roe v. Cal. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 16-cv-03745-WHO, 2017 WL 
2311303 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017); Mitchell, 2012 WL 2862265, report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2862147 
(S.D. Ala. July 11, 2012), aff ’d sub nom. Mitchell v. Governor of Ala., 500 F. App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 569 U.S. 973 (2013); Rustin v. Rustin (In re Rustin), No. 04-50890-NPO, 2011 WL 5443067 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 
2011); Turf Master, 2009 WL 2982846.
57 Search conducted Jan. 30, 2020. Also on that date, we searched the LEXIS Advance database of U.S. Supreme Court cases 
using the question What are the requirements of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine (again, no quotation marks or other punc-
tuation). The search brought up Lance as the first case in the expanded results; selecting “Graphical view” and clicking on the 
first graphical marker within the Lance Court’s opinion brought up the passage in which the Court quoted the lower court’s 
statement of Rooker–Feldman’s “requirements.” 
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who is not already familiar with the history of the Rooker–Feldman 
doctrine and the significance of Exxon Mobil’s narrowing of the doctrine,58 
it might seem like a good idea to go directly to Lance for what appears 
(outside its context) to be the Court’s most recent definitive statement of 
Rooker–Feldman’s requirements.59 If the researcher is working on a case 
that clearly fails to satisfy one or more of those requirements, and the 
researcher is pressed for time, it might be tempting to skip the remainder 
of Lance and not to bother with the older Exxon Mobil opinion.
That the Supreme Court presented the Lance district court’s formu-
lation as an enumeration of “requirements” might add to a harried 
researcher’s confidence that he or she has found a definitive statement of 
current law.60 By contrast, the correct criteria are stated in Exxon Mobil 
and reiterated in Lance as plain, unenumerated text.61 The attraction and 
power of an enumerated list seem to be confirmed by some lower courts’ 
use of enumeration in stating the Exxon Mobil criteria.62
It is worth noting that the Lance Court’s recitation of the district 
court’s formulation of Rooker–Feldman “requirements” is not the subject 
of any headnote in the unofficial reporters of Supreme Court decisions 
(or in the Westlaw Edge or LEXIS Advance report of Lance).63 Thus the 
reporters’ editors correctly understood that the Lance Court’s quotation 
of the district court was intended only as a description of the lower court’s 
statement, not an endorsement of it. And a researcher working the old-
fashioned way with West’s Federal Practice Digest 4th & 5th or the U.S. 
Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers’ Edition64 (or the online equivalent, 
58 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005) (“Variously interpreted in the lower courts, 
the doctrine has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases . . . . The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases 
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”); see also supra notes 8–9 and 
accompanying text.
59 See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 223, 246–47 (2008) (“During a typical 
electronic word search, [in contrast to a search using print digests and key numbers], a researcher will likely receive far less 
information about a case prior to reading its text. Usually, the only immediate information that an electronic researcher will 
have about a case (before being exposed to the case text) is that it meets the criteria of her individually crafted search. This is 
because electronic search results are frequently listed with the case citation followed by a short snippet of text from the case 
highlighting where in the case the searched-for terms appear. Researchers are invited to jump directly into not just the case 
text, but the section of the case text deemed most responsive to the search terms.” (footnote omitted)). 
60 See Lance, 546 U.S. at 462; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra note 70 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
62 See supra note 8. 
63 See Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1198–99 (2006) (per curiam); see also Peter A. Hook & Kurt R. Mattson, Surprising 
Differences: An Empirical Analysis of LexisNexis and West Headnotes in the Written Opinions of the 2009 Supreme Court 
Term, 109 L. Libr. J. 557, 559 (2017) (“Each headnote represents a point of law extracted from the case . . . .” (quoting Steven 
M. Barkan et al., Fundamentals of Legal Research 38 (9th ed. 2009))). 
64 See Hook & Mattson, supra note 63, at 559 (“Prior to computer-assisted legal research, a researcher typically started by 
referencing a multivolume printed digest. Digests contain all of the cases assigned headnotes with particular topics for a 
particular jurisdiction . . . .”).
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searching the West Key Number System or the LEXIS Advance headnotes 
from Supreme Court cases) would not find an entry presenting the Lance 
Court’s recitation of the lower court’s Rooker–Feldman “requirements” as 
a statement of current law.65
c. drafting of the Per curiam Lance opinion
As noted,66 all the district-court decisions that make this error cite 
as authority the Supreme Court’s Lance decision. Even those that got the 
message about privity67 take the remainder of Lance’s recounting of the 
lower court’s formulation as a definitive statement of law. Could it be that 
the Court’s per curiam opinion itself sowed the seeds of misinterpretation?
The Lance Court introduced its quotations from the lower court with 
the following words: “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine, the court explained, 
includes three requirements: . . . .”68 The main clause in this passage is the 
statement of what the doctrine “includes.” That the Court was tracking 
the lower court is presented as incidental information; the words “the 
court explained” are set off by commas as a nonrestrictive, parenthetical 
element.69 As a matter of grammatical structure, that element could be 
omitted without changing the meaning of the main clause, which is a 
straightforward statement that the “Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . includes 
three requirements.” That statement, of course, is not correct; the real 
requirements for the doctrine were articulated in Exxon Mobil. But the 
Lance Court’s use of the present indicative form of the verb “includes” 
could give an inattentive reader the impression that the statement is 
presented as an accurate description of current law.
The Court could have reduced the potential for misinterpretation by 
structuring the main clause as a statement about what the lower court 
said, rather than one about what Rooker–Feldman includes. And selecting 
words that ascribed less authoritativeness to the lower court’s view could 
have helped clarify that the Court was not adopting or endorsing that 
65 In the West Key Number System as displayed on Westlaw Edge, headnotes from the Lance district court’s opinion are 
accompanied by red flags, reflecting vacatur of the opinion. See West Key Number System, 106k509.2 (headnotes from Lance 
v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Colo. 2005)). Similarly, a search of LEXIS Advance displays stop signs accompanying 
headnotes from the Lance district court’s opinion. See LEXIS Advance results for search of U.S. Federal Cases, Headnotes, 
for “requirements of Rooker-Feldman doctrine” (headnotes from Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Colo. 2005)). 
66 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 54.
68 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 462 (2006) (per curiam).
69 See William Strunk Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 2 (3d ed. 1979) (“Enclose parenthetic expressions 
between commas.”); Marjorie E. Skillin & Robert M. Gay, Words into Type 189 (3d ed. 1974) (“A nonrestrictive phrase 
or clause is one that could be omitted without changing the meaning of the principal clause; it should be set off by commas.”).
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view.70 For example: “The district court opined that the Rooker–Feldman 
doctrine included three requirements: . . . .” Such an articulation would 
have made clear that the Court was giving the lower court’s view solely as 
part of the procedural history of the case and not as current law that the 
lower court “explained.”
Grammatical and stylistic niceties aside, the per curiam Lance opinion 
read as a whole does show that the Court did not adopt or endorse the 
lower court’s Rooker–Feldman formulation.71 And it is not easy to excuse 
the inattention—by counsel on both sides, and by a judge and his or her 
law clerk—that occurs each time the misunderstanding of Lance appears 
in a court opinion.
Vi. conclusion
However small the effects of these several decisions’ repeated error in 
stating the approach for Rooker–Feldman analysis, the mistake seems to 
be getting into some judicial food chains. It first took place shortly after 
the Exxon Mobil and Lance decisions and has been repeated, including 
recently, over the years since. The sooner it gets removed, before others 
consume it to their possible detriment, the better.
More broadly, these decisions exemplify the danger of relying on a 
passage from a court opinion—even a Supreme Court opinion—without 
reading enough of the opinion to understand the context and purpose of 
the passage.
Finally, these decisions serve as a reminder that a reviewing court 
should take care to avoid framing a description of the proceedings below 
in terms that might mistakenly be read as an adoption or endorsement of 
the lower court’s analysis.
70 The authoritative appearance of the district court’s Rooker–Feldman “requirements” was likely enhanced by the Supreme 
Court’s presentation of them as an enumerated list, in contrast to the Court’s later presentation of the Exxon Mobil formu-
lation as plain, unenumerated text. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 462, 464; see also supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
71 For a court that read Lance right, see Commodities Export Co. v. City of Detroit, No. 09-CV-11060-DT, 2010 WL 
2633042, at *10–11 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2010), aff ’d on other grounds sub nom. Commodities Export Co. v. Detroit Int’l 
Bridge Co., 695 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2012), see also supra note 11.
